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Essay
What’s Going On?
The Psychoanalysis Metaphor
for Educating Lawyer-Counselors
JEFFREY M. LIPSHAW
In this Essay prepared for the Connecticut Law Review’s 2012
Symposium on legal education reform, I propose an alternative to the
dominant metaphor of “lawyer as warrior” for educating the many
lawyers whom clients will seek out as counselors even at early stages in
their careers. My preferred metaphor is “lawyer as psychoanalyst”
because it invokes the need for lawyer-counselors to understand clients’
idioms and meanings, or more generally “what’s going on” beyond the
mere analysis and application of the rules of positive law. Like lawyers,
psychoanalysts learn a technical discipline (whether or not either
discipline constitutes a science) but need to apply it non-technically in the
process of counseling patients. I consider implications of the metaphor for
lawyer-counselors and their education, concluding with some preliminary
and modest suggestions about how reflection on the “repressed
positivistic” and “courting surprise” might benefit our students in the
“what’s going on” aspect of client-centeredness.
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What’s Going On?
The Psychoanalysis Metaphor
for Educating Lawyer-Counselors
JEFFREY M. LIPSHAW

∗

I. INTRODUCTION
In previous works,1 I have laid out a theoretical basis for the contention
that modern lawyers, at least those working outside of the traditional
litigation fora, need to be interdisciplinary theorists, notwithstanding the au
courant meme whereby critics of legal education disdain theory in favor of
“skills.” I am afraid that “interdisciplinarity,”2 having eight syllables, and
“theory” being, well, theoretical, each get a bad rap for being highfalutin,3
when in fact I see them as central to the everyday practice of the vast bulk
of the profession whose practice is more counseling and facilitation than
∗
Associate Professor, Suffolk University Law School. A.B., University of Michigan; J.D.,
Stanford University. Thanks to Rick Buckingham, Mary Karen Rogers, Betsy Armour, and Ian
Menchini at Suffolk for assistance in finding data about the profession. I received insightful comments
on substance and form from Bill Chin (Executive Dean for Research at the Harvard Medical School),
Anna Ivey (whose business includes counseling aspiring law students and their families), A.J. Sutter
(the prototype of the reflective business lawyer practitioner), Liam O’Connell (one of my contracts
students), and law professors Nancy Rapoport, Andy Perlman, Pierre Schlag, Michael Madison, Patrick
Shin, Stewart Macaulay, and Joan MacLeod Heminway. I have shown this to Steven Cooper to satisfy
myself that I am in the ballpark regarding his thesis, but any errors in its application here are mine.
1
Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Contract as Meaning: An Introduction to “Contract as Promise at 30,” 45
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 601, 602–03 (2012) (“[O]ur job as educators is not merely to train doctrinal
technicians, but also to groom what I will refer to as lawyer-theorists.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Venn Diagram of Business Lawyering Judgments: Toward a
Theory of Practical Metadisciplinarity, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 27 (2011) [hereinafter Lipshaw,
Venn Diagram] (“We need to define a new professional discipline: the field of metadisciplinarity. . . .
[A] higher order skill: it means being an expert in the making of interdisciplinary judgments.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). The thesis there was that effective business lawyers need to wade into the
overlap between that which is a purely legal judgment and that which is a purely business judgment.
Concurrently with this Essay, I am writing an article that reflects on what a business lawyer needs to be
aware of when wading into that overlap. That is, there are limits on “thinking like a lawyer,” indeed,
the limits on thinking generally, when compared with the moment of decision and action based on that
decision. Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Dissecting the Two-Handed Lawyer: Thinking Versus Action in
Business
Lawyering,
BERKELEY
BUS.
L.J.
(forthcoming
2013),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2095357.
2
Lipshaw, Venn Diagram, supra note 1, at 33.
3
Scott H. Greenfield, Interdisciplinary, or Why We Can’t Have Nice Things, SIMPLE JUSTICE: A
NEW YORK CRIM. DEF. BLOG (Apr. 8, 2012, 4:52 AM), http://blog.simplejustice.us/2012/04/08/interdi
sciplinary-or-why-we-cant-have-nice-things.aspx.
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4

advocacy.
The implicit metaphor for a lawyer in traditional legal
education is warrior. In this metaphor, the client’s goal is clear, there is no
obvious search for meaning, and the lawyer’s job is simply to vanquish the
other side.5
We have learned, however, that even warriors need sometimes to ask
why the war is being fought, and to adapt their methods if the conventional
strategies do not fit.6 Based on a long career as litigator, deal lawyer,
4
There is nothing new under the sun. Critics have been noting the practicing bar’s call for more
skills, the dearth of focus on counseling in legal education, and the fact that counseling has involved
significant interdisciplinary skills for the better part of fifty years. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The
Responsibility of Law Schools: Educating Lawyers as Counselors and Problem Solvers, 58 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 5 (1995) (reacting to criticism of the interdisciplinary turn in legal education, and
observing that legal education is strong in doctrine and legal analysis, but “is strikingly weak in
teaching other foundational skills and knowledge that lawyers need as counselors, problem solvers,
negotiators, and as architects of transactions and organizations”); Harrop A. Freeman, The Role of
Lawyers as Counselors, 7 WM. & MARY L. REV. 203, 204 (1966) (criticizing the sterility of the
Langdellian case method and noting “in recent years there has been an insistent demand on the part of
alumni, practicing lawyers, that lawyer skills and the art of lawyering be taught”); Thomas L. Shaffer,
Lawyers, Counselors, and Counselors at Law, 61 A.B.A. J. 854, 854 (1975) (discussing the intersection
of lawyering and counseling).
Nor will I be offering suggestions that have not been offered, in one form or another, in
comprehensive critiques of legal education like those that Roy Stuckey has offered. That volume
proposes, for example, that the law school curriculum ought to be helping students acquire the
attributes of self-reflection and lifelong learning. ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL
EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD MAP 66 (2007). Stuckey also advocates as a best practice the
employment of “context-based education” for, other among things, the development of practical
wisdom. Id. at 141–57.
5
Here again, very little is new. Almost two decades ago, Gary Blasi offered an encyclopedic
assessment of how lawyers go about solving problems, noting at the outset the prototypical lawyer in
cultural context was “a litigator, very likely a trial lawyer, knowledgeable about both legal doctrine and
procedure, and able to put that knowledge to use on behalf of an individual client, generally in a fairly
simple dispute with another party, in order to achieve a desired result.” Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers
Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313,
325 (1995). Thomas Shaffer has also observed:

Lawyers are counselors—some of them are good counselors; some are bad. Most of
the attitudes they bring to their professional training are poor attitudes for
counselors, and most of their training in law school is useless training for
counselors. The lawyer in me sees myself, whether I admit it or not, as an expert in
aggression. Law—I was told when I was admitted to the bar—is the difference
between a debate and an alley fight. My aggression is sanctioned, licensed, and
sanctified aggression, because it is better than a fist fight. Law is an alternative to
chaos, and I am a specialist in this alternative.
Shaffer, supra note 4, at 854.
6
In 2009, the United States military in Afghanistan shifted to what it called a “counterinsurgency” or “COIN” strategy to deal with the reality that it was not simply fighting an enemy, but
seeking to stabilize a host nation. See Kristina Wong, 10 Years of Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan—
Is It Working?, ABC NEWS (Oct. 8, 2011, 9:15 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/10/10years-of-counterinsurgency-in-afghanistan-is-it-working/ (discussing the counter-insurgency strategy in
Afghanistan during an interview with Lt. Col. John Paganini, director of the United States Army’s
Counterinsurgency Center).
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generalist, and businessperson, working both in law firms and in-house, I
am willing to assert (with Marvin Gaye) that war is often (even mostly) not
the answer.7 What clients want may not be so clear. Nevertheless, legal
education and practice, at least for the non-warriors, are remarkably sparse
when it comes to the theory and practice by which lawyers as counselors
and facilitators figure out “what’s going on.” Hence, I question the warrior
metaphor, provocatively or annoyingly or even inaccurately. I use
metaphor and analogy here the way cognitive scientists suggest it occurs in
the creative process generally: to upset established categories and
classifications.8 Or in the image proffered by Steven Cooper, a
psychoanalytic theorist and practitioner to whose work I turn to extensively
in this Essay, I wish to “court surprise,” to take something that it is familiar
and make it unfamiliar, and thereby learn from it.9
The metaphor I suggest here as more appropriate for much of what
lawyers do in practice is psychoanalysis.10 That discipline (or at least those
7

For example, Marvin Gaye sings,
Mother, mother
There’s too many of you crying
Brother, brother, brother
There’s far too many of you dying
You know we’ve got to find a way
To bring some lovin’ here today, Yeah
Father, father
We don’t need to escalate
You see, war is not the answer
For only love can conquer hate
You know we’ve got to find a way
To bring some lovin’ here today
Picket lines and picket signs
Don’t punish me with brutality
Talk to me, so you can see
Oh, what’s going on
What’s going
What’s going on
What’s going on

RENALDO BENSON, ALFRED CLEVELAND, & MARVIN GAYE, WHAT’S GOING ON? (Tamla Records
1971), available at www.elyrics.net/inc/print.php.
8
Mark Turner, Categories and Analogies, in ANALOGICAL REASONING: PERSPECTIVES OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, COGNITIVE SCIENCE, AND PHILOSOPHY 3, 3 (David H. Helman ed., 1988).
9
STEVEN H. COOPER, OBJECTS OF HOPE: EXPLORING POSSIBILITY AND LIMIT IN
PSYCHOANALYSIS 263–65 (2000).
10
Psychoanalysis is one discipline within the broader category of psychotherapy. Not all
psychotherapists are psychoanalysts. I use psychoanalysis rather than psychotherapy for the metaphor
simply because it happens that the thinker, Steven Cooper, whose work triggered it is a psychoanalyst,
and I depend largely on his vision of the analyst-patient relationship. Within the category of
psychoanalysis, there are many different schools of thought, beginning with Freud and including
psychoanalysts who have rejected some or all of Freud’s theories. Cooper is an eclectic theorist, but
most closely allied with the relational school. Id. at xii.
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whose work I refer to here) is perhaps uniquely focused on theory in a
variety of ways: theory in the descriptive sense (psychoanalysts aspire to
develop coherent and accurate descriptions of the mind and its
development just as lawyers aspire to develop coherent and accurate
statements of the positive law); theory in a more general sense as how
clients (or anyone for that matter) make sense of “what’s going on” (i.e.,
theory as a source of meaning); and theory of the means by which the
professional assists the client in practice.11
At the risk of oversimplification, here are two anecdotes, reflecting
prototypes (even caricatures) at opposite ends of the metaphoric continuum
of the lawyer’s professional interaction with clients.12 At one end of this
polarity resides the single-minded zealous advocate within the adversarial
justice system.13 This evokes the metaphor of lawyer as warrior. A
Not relevant here, as far as I can see, are the ongoing challenges, since Karl Popper, to the
underlying scientific validity of psychoanalysis. See KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS:
THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 45–47 (Routledge Classics 2002) (1963) (“I began to feel
more and more dissatisfied with these three theories—the Marxist theory of history, psycho-analysis,
and individual psychology; and I began to feel dubious about their claims to scientific status.”); see
also Harriete C. Johnson, Theories of Kernberg and Kohut: Issues of Scientific Validation, 65 SOC.
SERV. REV. 403, 403–04 (1991) (evaluating the criticisms of psychoanalytic theory as being
“reductionistic” and “unscientific and culturally biased”).
First, my view is that whether
psychoanalysis is helpful or useful does not necessarily depend on how it fits within demarcations of
positivistic brain or mind science. Second, I feel the same way about law. Whether the discipline of
law can be characterized as science, as Langdell wished it to be, is irrelevant to its utility.
11
The most explicit connection in the literature between psychotherapy and lawyering is
ANDREW S. WATSON, THE LAWYER IN THE INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING PROCESS (1976). Dr.
Watson was a psychiatrist and a pioneer in interdisciplinary law and psychiatry at the University of
Michigan. Andrew S. Watson—Biography, UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH.: HISTORY & TRADITIONS,
http://www.law.umich.edu/historyandtraditions/faculty/Faculty_Lists/Alpha_
Faculty/Pages/AndrewSWatson.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2013). Dr. Watson’s approach is not
metaphorical in the least. It is a “how-to” text, directly applying concepts developed in psychoanalytic
practice, like transference, counter-transference, and resistance, to the lawyer-client interviewing and
counseling process. WATSON, supra, at 146–56. Or to continue the theme: “Talk to me, so you can
see, oh what’s going on.” BENSON, CLEVELAND & GAYE, supra note 7.
12
Pierre Schlag is correct in asking me why only two metaphors. I agree that there are infinite
metaphors possible. To suggest just a few from literature, theater, and film: lawyer as mouthpiece
(Tom Hagen), lawyer as liberal hero (Henry Drummond), lawyer as saint (Atticus Finch), lawyer as
shyster (Vinny Gambini). My two metaphors strike me as helpful in dealing with the common
distinction between litigation and transactional practice, even though I recognize that real life practice
categories can be far more nuanced.
13
See Paula Schaefer, Harming Business Clients with Zealous Advocacy: Rethinking the Attorney
Advisor’s Touchstone, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 253–54 (2011), for a thoughtful claim that the
obligation to be a zealous advocate is often inappropriate in a counseling setting. To be clear, I do not
believe that the rules of professional responsibility regarding zealous advocacy in an adversarial setting
require that lawyers act out the warrior metaphor. The Preamble to the Model Rules states:
As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As advisor, a
lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client’s legal rights
and obligations and explains their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer
zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system. As
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number of years ago, I participated in an interview with a candidate for a
law school juvenile justice clinic. The subject turned to counseling the
accused juvenile about confessions. The candidate, an experienced
criminal lawyer within the juvenile justice system, said, in so many words,
even if confession were good for the soul, it is not good for the body, and
my only concern is the body (i.e., keeping the body free from
incarceration). I translated this into the following statement of the lawyerclient relationship:
Client, I am not your therapist, I am your lawyer. I have only
one mission and that is either to beat the rap or to reduce the
rap to its most benign juridical consequence. As to any other
physical, psychic, emotional, or life needs, please see the
appropriate allied professional.
At the other pole lies the transactional lawyer-counselor. This evokes
a wholly different metaphor for the professional encounter. Many years
ago, I represented a client (call him Joe) in the acquisition of a business.14
The seller was not a trustworthy character in a business in which there was
a distinct possibility of side deals, payoffs, commingling of personal
expenses with business expenses, and so on. Joe’s business judgment was
that, as long as the business’s revenues could be verified, he would rely on
industry standards rather than on the seller’s disclosures as the basis for
valuation of the business. But even though we lawyered the usual panoply
of contractual protections against the possibility of undisclosed liabilities—
for example, structuring the deal as an asset sale rather than a stock sale,
extensive representations and warranties, indemnities, escrowed purchase
price holdbacks—there was still the possibility, despite best efforts at due
diligence, that buying this business meant taking on some undisclosed
skeleton in the closet.
Shortly before Joe signed and simultaneously closed the deal, Joe and
his wife (call her Jane) visited me. She had been crying, and began crying
negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with
requirements of honest dealings with others. As an evaluator, a lawyer acts by
examining a client’s legal affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2011).
Professor Schaefer accurately describes conduct I have often observed over the course of my
career: lawyers do indeed confuse their obligation of advocacy in “warrior” settings with more
appropriate obligations to the client in others. I have previously written about the tendency to conflate
public advocacy of the client’s cause with private justification or rationalization of the client’s conduct.
Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Law as Rationalization: Getting Beyond Reason to Business Ethics, 37 U. TOL. L.
REV. 959, 960 (2006). It occurs to me as a result of that the rules of professional responsibility can be a
“repressed positivistic” as I discuss infra notes 57–94 and accompanying text. That needs to be a
separate discussion.
14
I have altered the details to preserve confidentiality, but the story is accurate, to the best of my
recollection, having occurred well over twenty years ago, in all material respects.
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again in my office. She was afraid. Even for this wealthy family, it was a
significant commitment of assets. She was not involved in the due
diligence or the decision making. She might have a nice seat in first class,
but Joe was still flying the plane into what might be stormy weather. “Jeff,
should we being doing this deal?” I am sure I said something like the
following:
I cannot answer that question for you. I can tell you that we
have responsibly and professionally documented the deal to
give you a reasonable amount of legal protection, but I also
know that there are limits to how much the contracts can
protect you. There is always some amount of good faith and
trust in the seller that goes into this, and Joe and his
associates have to make the call on that. I think I am more
risk averse than Joe is, which is neither good nor bad, but it
means we might make different decisions about whether the
risk is worth taking going forward. Ultimately, you have to
decide with Joe that you either trust what he is doing or not,
and he has to decide what to do in light of your uneasiness.
That is between you two.
In Venn Diagram,15 I described a set of business lawyering decisions
that are truly interdisciplinary, in that they require the decision maker to
weigh consequences that are wholly determined by business considerations
(or any non-legal consideration) against those that are wholly legal. I
argued that the ultimate interdisciplinary judgment still needs to be made
in a single mind that, for better or worse, purports to incorporate
knowledge from both disciplines and, more importantly, in many instances
the single mind would need to be that of the business lawyer. In my
experience, great lawyers as counselors seek out the interdisciplinary
overlap and are comfortable operating within it. That is so even if, as in
the Joe and Jane story, the ultimate decision does not fall on the lawyer.
The reason is that the sources of meaning, or “what’s going on,” will
almost certainly arise outside the area of the Venn diagram that is solely
“law,” and we need something other than traditional metaphors of the
lawyer-client relationship to plumb them.
This is not a universal view; indeed, it runs counter to the seminal (and
excellent) text by David Binder and his co-authors on the “lawyer as
counselor” relationship.16 The Binder text advocates a “client-centered”
15

Lipshaw, Venn Diagram, supra note 1.
DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 4–8
(3d ed. 2012) (explaining why lawyers should adopt the client-centered counseling approach). For
additional resources on lawyer as counselor, see supra note 4. To be fair, Binder discusses explicitly
the extent to which lawyers need to be “psychosocial” analysts. See infra note 43 and accompanying
16
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approach, in that it recognizes that the client, and not the lawyer, “owns”
the problem and is primarily responsible for integrating legal advice into
the totality of considerations underlying a decision.17 I have no argument
with that position. I suspect I am more forceful than Binder, however, in
proposing the psychoanalysis metaphor for counseling practice.18
The metaphor itself is interdisciplinary, but so are most instances of
counseling practice. I do not mean “interdisciplinary” as legal academics
usually mean it in subjects like “law and economics” or “law and feminist
theory,” even if I believe that academic and mundane interdisciplinarity
invoke similar category-busting processes. Teaching skills about “what’s
going on” is a matter of creating educational spaces in which young
lawyers come to terms with thinking in all the idioms that clients use. At
the risk of some jargon, this is a move to a higher order of thinking. It is
not merely thinking in an interdisciplinary way. Instead it is thinking
about how one goes about the process of interdisciplinary thinking.19 In
mundane terms, it is the discipline encompassing those skills necessary in
the first instance truly to understand what a client wants (to the extent
possible) and only after that to figure out, either legally or otherwise, how
to get it done.20
text (“Your professional task is to help clients achieve their legal goals, not to provide psychological
counseling. Unless you have specialized training as a psychologist or a social worker, you cannot
expect to identify and remove deep psychological needs blocking clients’ full participation.”).
17
BINDER ET AL., supra note 16, at 4–8 (arguing that (a) “clients are autonomous ‘owners’ of
their problems”; (b) “clients are generally in a better position than lawyers to . . . assess the . . . nonlegal” aspects of problems; (c) “clients are . . . in a better position . . . to determine what risks are worth
taking”; (d) “clients are capable of . . . participating in the counseling process and making important
decisions”; and (e) “active lawyer-client collaboration promotes effective implementation of
decisions”).
18
Obviously, the Binder text recognizes that lawyers should be active in helping clients identify
non-legal consequences and solutions to problems. Id. at 9–10. The text also briefly suggests three
strategies for accomplishing this, namely employing whatever industry knowledge the lawyer has,
calling upon everyday experience, and explicitly considering the impact of the decision on third parties.
Id. at 405–07.
19
The subtitle of Venn Diagram is “Toward a Theory of Practical Metadisciplinarity.” Lipshaw,
Venn Diagram, supra note 1, at 1. I coined the term “metadisciplinarity” because I thought it described
in one word exactly what I meant. I now find myself apologizing for the jargon. Anything that uses
the prefix “meta-” nowadays is fair game for satire. So, at least for this essay, I am retiring it, even
though I never met a “meta” I did not like.
20
Joan Heminway, who teaches at Tennessee, pointed out the existence of mediation clinics like
those at her law school, the University of Tennessee. See UNIV. OF TENN. COLL. OF LAW MEDIATION
CLINIC, http://www.law.utk.edu/clinic/mediation.shtml. She asked me how these metaphors square
with this kind of mediation training as at Tennessee. Her question made me realize understanding
“what’s going on” applies not just to counseling, as I discuss here, but to mediation and negotiation as
well. Mediators need to understand “what’s going on” from the perspective of multiple parties and
then to find ways to accommodate. A negotiator needs to understand “what’s going on” from the
standpoint of the negotiating counterpart, and needs to figure out a way to accommodate consistent
with the client’s needs. Some of the best negotiators I have ever met (their names would not surprise
you) would turn to their clients and say out loud words to the effect, “Do you understand what their
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To that end, I propose that we as legal educators consider in our
curriculum design and instruction, and we ask our students to consider as
they begin to apply legal doctrine and skills to real-life counseling
situations, the question “what does that mean?” or “what’s going on?” In
the balance of this Essay, I will: (1) use the psychoanalysis metaphor to
consider not only how the lawyer-counselor might approach the lawyerclient interaction, but also how the profession might go about education,
training, and licensure; and (2) brainstorm some practical suggestions for
enhancing our graduates’ ability to ask the question “what’s going on?” in
a meaningful way.
II. THE LAWYER-COUNSELOR AS PSYCHOTHERAPIST METAPHOR
In reflecting years later on my encounter with Joe and Jane (and others
like it), it occurred to me there was a powerful metaphor for lawyercounselors as psychoanalysts. The point of the metaphor is to take the
focus off of technical or scientific knowledge developed within an
academic discipline, and instead to highlight what it takes in the
professional encounter to hear the client in her own idiom, and to
understand meanings beyond those that are of concern within the
professional community of which the lawyer or analyst is a part.
A. The Lawyer-Counselor Industry and What It Does
The first question is: when in their careers do lawyers begin to get
called upon for practical wisdom? As I believe it can occur very early, I do
not think it is responsible for most law schools simply to leave “what’s
going on?” education to life experience or on-the-job training.
My empirical intuitions are: (1) the smaller and less specialized the
practice, the more likely it is that a lawyer will spend time working in the
psychotherapist rather than the warrior metaphor; and (2) in such practices,
it is more likely that lawyers will be so engaged at earlier stages of their
careers. Anecdotally, even in my large firm, I can remember the young
associate training meetings at which the grizzled senior lawyers told us
how the “care and feeding” of clients was an art learned over many years.
It seems reasonable to think a large and hierarchical law firm would have
far greater luxury than, say, a five-lawyer firm to ease young lawyers into
the kind of client relationship that the “care and feeding” metaphor
suggests. The inference applies a fortiori to young lawyers hanging out a
shingle. But small firms and solo offices, not mega-firms like the one in

concern is? That’s a good point. We need to figure out a way to accommodate it.” This is also fodder
for a separate discussion.
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which I practiced, constitute the bulk of private practice. Most small
firms report themselves as doing general law, and only a small number are
boutique litigation firms.22 It is also not the case that lawyers generally
begin their careers in big firms and then move to smaller ones; a
substantial number of young lawyers begin their careers in the small firm
environment.23 It is likely that those lawyers are quicker to take on more
responsibility for care and feeding than their large firm counterparts.24
Finally, the further down the law school rankings, the more likely it is that
its graduates will begin their careers in small firms or in solo practice.25
21
The ABA data on private practice firm size is consistent over time. About 45–50% of all
lawyers reported themselves as solo practitioners in 1980, 1991, and 2000. Another 22% reported
themselves as in firms of 2 to 5 lawyers in 1980, declining to 15% in 1991 and 2000. On the other
hand, only 13–14% of lawyers reported themselves as working in firms with over 100 lawyers in 1991
and
2000. ABA MKT. RES. DEP’T, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS (2012), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/lawyer_demo
graphics_2012_revised.authcheckdam.pdf.
22
A leading consulting firm’s 2001 survey of 110 law firms consisting of 1 to 12 lawyers showed
68 of them reporting as “general law” or “corporate/commercial non-litigation”, and only 28 as some
kind of litigation firm. Similarly 453 of the 786 lawyers constituting those firms reported as “general
law” or “corporate/commercial non-litigation”, and only 227 reported as expressly litigators or trial
lawyers. ALTMAN WEIL, INC., 2001 SMALL LAW FIRM ECONOMIC SURVEY, at xix-xx (2001).
23
The most thorough work on young lawyer careers is RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., NALP FOUND.
FOR L. CAREER RES. & EDUC., AFTER THE J.D.: FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL
CAREERS 27 (2004). While most young lawyers do not immediately go solo (5% in the study versus
32% of all lawyers), the number of lawyers who begin in firms of 2 to 20 lawyers is not that different
from the number of lawyers in such firms generally: 25% versus 19%. Id. at 27; see also infra note 25
(discussing the Suffolk University data on small firm placement).
24
Even though the numbers of young lawyers who reported themselves as “specialized” do not
vary significantly from small firms to large firms, lawyers in small firms report themselves as working
on far greater numbers of individual matters with far less concentration on a single subject area.
DINOVITZER ET AL., supra note 23, at 34–37. I infer a qualitative difference in the experience, whether
or not that experience involves counseling (even though I am inclined to believe it does) from this
observation by the authors:

The differences among the practice settings are further emphasized by examining
the type of work that lawyers report doing within each setting. Using a statistical
technique termed “factor analysis,” the AJD data analyses combine these tasks into
three major groupings, or factors. One factor was labeled “routine,” to indicate work
such as routine research or due diligence; a second, “independence,” represents tasks
that allow the lawyers some degree of autonomy in their performance; and a third,
“trust,” represents tasks for which a great deal of responsibility is vested in a lawyer.
It is not surprising that lawyers in venues where resources are stretched thin—public
defenders and legal services lawyers—report relatively high trust and independence.
Lawyers in private practice generally report lower levels of trust and independence,
with strikingly lower levels in the largest firms. These large firm lawyers also
report correspondingly high levels of routine activity but not as much routine as for
the solo practitioners.
Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
25
By way of example, compare two schools in the Boston area, Harvard and my school, Suffolk.
Harvard reports that 59.3% of its 2010 graduates went to work for law firms (down from 65.1% in

1366

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:1355

These data tend to support my more casual observations that clients do
not always have the luxury of turning to seasoned old veterans for wise
advice. For example, I am presently acting as an informal advisory board
member (not a lawyer,) to a recent graduate who is involved as a principal,
and is acting as in-house lawyer (for all intents and purposes), for a small
startup company. It is clear that the recent graduate is operating in the
Venn overlap between business and legal advice. I get calls fairly
regularly from recent graduates wanting to brainstorm similar kinds of
mixed law and business issues. When I was a general counsel, I needed to
staff business units with their own general counsels. The economics and
career path dictated that I was often assigning lawyers to these positions
who were roughly four to seven years out of school to those positions.
Whether we like it or not, lawyers get licensed to practice when they
are relatively young, and will likely find themselves out there in the
counseling trenches without additional supervision. It is unreasonable to
expect that non-elite law schools should restrict themselves to training in
the warrior metaphor with the hope and expectation that others will
provide the training or life lessons that might make them better
counselors.26 These schools are throwing new lawyers out into
2009). In 2010, of the 349 graduates who went to work for law firms, 333, or 56.5% of its entire class,
went to work for law firms of more than 100 lawyers. (48.9% of the class went to work for law firms
of more than 500 lawyers.) No students started solo practices, and only 6 went to work for firms of 25
or fewer lawyers. Additional Employment Data, HARV. LAW SCH. OFF. OF CAREER SERV. (Nov. 29,
2012), http://www.law.harvard.edu/current/careers/ocs/employment-statistics/additional-employmentdata.html.
Suffolk, on the other hand, has hovered in the U.S. News “third tier,” with an occasional dip into
the fourth. It averaged placing 7.4% of its graduates in 100+ lawyer firms from 2001 to 2010, with a
peak of 9.8% in 2007, the year before the subprime crisis precipitated the downturn in legal profession
employment. On the other hand, the school has placed 20.8% of its graduates in firms of 2–10 lawyers
over the same period. Suffolk University Law School Career Development Office Graduate
Employment Surveys, 2001–2010 (on file with Author). Even so, Suffolk sits in downtown Boston.
After the J.D. reported that 8% of young lawyers in Boston were in solo practice, 19% in offices of 2
to 20 lawyers, and 20% in offices of 100+ lawyers (as a point of comparison, the latter percentage in
New York City was 42%; D.C., 29%; Chicago, 26%; and Atlanta, Houston, and Minneapolis, 20%).
By comparison, in Oklahoma, 10% reported as being in solo practice, with 47% in offices of 2 to 20
lawyers, and none in offices with 100+ lawyers. In Tennessee, 11% reported as being in solo practice,
with 41% in offices of 2 to 20 lawyers, and 5% in offices with 100+ lawyers. DINOVITZER ET AL.,
supra note 23, at 29.
26
This is all distinct from a different but somewhat related issue: the increasing perception,
certainly over the course of my career, that corporate general counsel see litigation as a highly
inefficient and wasteful dispute resolution device, at least in cases where the stakes are not at the “betthe-company” level. I recall one of my law firm partners internally extolling internally the client who
was willing to pay “millions for defense, but not a penny for tribute.” When I was in-house, and a
business leader was inclined to litigate, I would suggest that law firms loved nothing more than a
highly principled client, and that all such fees would be a charge against the leader’s profit and loss
statement. See Blake D. Morant, The Declining Prevalence of Trials as a Dispute Resolution Device:
Implications for the Academy, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1123, 1124 (2012) (advocating for a new
legal education for a “world in which full-blown trials have become anachronisms”).
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environments in which it is highly likely they will be dealing with “Joe and
Jane” situations early in their careers, notwithstanding the fact that they are
young and inexperienced. The irony is that it has taken an unprecedented
economic shock to the profession, particularly the Big Law segment,
combined with increasing tuition and corresponding student debt that
seems less capable of ever being repaid, to focus our attention.27 But these
data suggest that the reasons for educating lawyers other than “as warriors”
existed long before anyone ever considered the possibility of systemic
banking failure arising out of sub-prime mortgage securitization.
B. Shifting Metaphors for Theory and Practice of Lawyer Counseling
In prototypical “lawyer as warrior” situations, we lawyers are still the
generals, and the discussion remains focused on how best to attack the
target.28 As soon as we move out of interaction within the discipline and
talk to clients, the contrast between formal legal language and ordinary
idiom is even more significant.29 My thesis is that, in counseling situations
like “Joe and Jane,” when it is conceivable that war is not the answer,
effective lawyers become interdisciplinary theorists no less than effective
psychoanalysts (at least in the view offered here), learning the client’s
idiom whether or not the lawyers understand consciously that this is what
they are doing.
It took a long time after law school for me to figure this out on my
27
See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, Law Schools’ Applications Fall as Costs Rise and Jobs Are Cut, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 2013, at A1 (blaming the drop on law school applications to a possible “30-year low”
on the “perceptions of the declining job market”); Patrice Hill, The Mean Economy: Even Law Firms
Hit Hard by Recession, WASH. TIMES (Aug 27, 2012), www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/aug/27/
marlton-nj-terri-a-doring-used-to-take-her-comfort/ (“As corporations slashed their spending and staffs
in the deepest downturn since the 1930s, they left no stone unturned. Once-plum legal jobs and prize
contracts got jettisoned along with rank-and-file workers, and many American lawyers, perhaps for the
first time, found out what it was like to be without a job.”).
28
Here is an example of law and lore as contrasting idioms even within the disciplinary
boundaries of professional technique. There is no rule in the formal canon of the law of evidence that
says a lawyer should refrain, when conducting cross-examination, from asking a witness a question as
to which the lawyer does not already know the answer. Refraining in that way, with limited
exceptions, is, however, accepted conventional wisdom. See James W. McElhaney, Cross-Exam
Surprises, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 24, 2006, 4:46 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/cross_exa
m_surprises/ (discussing how on cross-examination, one should “[n]ever ask a question unless: you
know the answer”).
29
The warrior metaphor has another implication for the lawyer as counselor. Being a general,
whether in war or litigation, means being in a particular spot in the command-and-control hierarchy.
Not surprisingly, those who have given thought to how we go about training lawyers outside the
warrior metaphor have criticized the “generalship” that tends to goes along with it. For example, Dr.
Watson rejected the model whereby “a great many lawyer-counselors are inclined to dictate or at least
tell their clients what they should do in a given situation.” WATSON, supra note 11, at 142. Binder
calls the alternative “client-centered” counseling. BINDER ET AL., supra note 16, at 3. Watson (taking
a cue from D.E. Rosenthal), calls it the “participatory” model of the lawyer-client relationship.
WATSON, supra note 11, at 142–43.
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own. Though the opportunities for material advancement may have
changed in the thirty-seven years since I began the process of applying to
law school, I suspect that other motivations for going to law school have
not changed significantly. In other words, my recent conversations with
parents and undergraduates suggest that present-day law school aspirants
have no more conception about what lawyers do than I did, but if they have
any image, it is “lawyer as warrior” for all that is good. I was a liberal arts
major—settling in history after dalliances with mathematics, English, and
political science—with strong verbal, written, and oral skill sets, and I
liked what I had seen or read about real and theatrical lawyering. My
metaphor for a lawyer then was “hero,” with the prototype being Henry
Drummond, the fictional Clarence Darrow defending the Darwin-teaching
Tennessean in Inherit the Wind.30 I had no idea that lawyers did the “Joe
and Jane” kind of work, and probably would not have considered myself to
have aptitude for it in any event. My only defense is that I did not know
what I did not know.31 Perhaps if I had been more curious in law school, I
would have found someone who could have informed me more
completely, but I doubt it.
Paul Brest, who never had the burden of teaching me and who became
the dean of my law school alma mater well after I graduated, was exposing
the interdisciplinary counseling and problem-solving failure of the
curriculum in 2000, the year after my twentieth reunion.32 At that point,
when I was in my second iteration as the general counsel of a large
industrial business, Dean Brest’s observation, worth quoting in full here,
would have struck me as patently obvious.
A client with a problem consults a lawyer rather than, say, a
psychologist, investment counselor or business advisor
because he perceives the problem to have a significant legal
dimension. But few real world problems conform to the
boundaries that define and separate different professional
disciplines. It is therefore a rare client who really wants his
lawyer to confine herself strictly to “the law.” Rather, most
clients expect their lawyers to integrate legal considerations
30
ROBERT EDWIN LEE, INHERIT THE WIND (1955). My impression was also that lawyers had
better employment prospects and were more likely to make a decent living than history professors.
31
I was already a litigation partner, almost ten years out of law school, in a large Detroit-based
law firm, and I still had no clue what transactional lawyers did. We had retained a Big Six accounting
firm partner as an expert witness. One day he called with some new business. What I thought I heard
him say was, “Do you have an MNA department?” I thought “MNA” must be some kind of bank. Of
course, he was looking for a mergers and acquisitions or “M&A” lawyer. Ironically, within a couple
years, having gone through my first of several mid-life crises, this one in which I came to terms with
the fact that I hated being a litigator, I had become an M&A lawyer.
32
Paul Brest, Skeptical Thoughts: Integrating Problem-Solving Into Legal Curriculum Faces
Uphill Climb, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2000, at 20, 22.
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with other aspects of their problems. Solutions are often
constrained or facilitated by the law, but finding the best
solution—a solution that addresses all of the client’s
concerns—usually requires more than technical legal skill.33
At the same time Dean Brest was writing this, I was coaching young
lawyers I had hired to be general counsel of large business units within our
company. I would tell them:
When you are sitting in your executive team’s meetings
discussing important issues of the business, practice being a
businessperson by putting yourself mentally in the place of
the CEO. Think about the business decision you would
make, and then compare it to what the CEO or the team
ultimately decides. Then go ahead and consider whether
there is legal input you need to make.
For all the highfalutin reputation of theory and interdisciplinarity, this is
the mundane practical implication I have been advocating.34
Theory in this context is about derivation of meaning from
circumstance, and it is a part of life, not just law or science.35 Lawyers of
all stripes, from Main Street solo practitioners to Wall Street mega-merger
specialists, work with their clients to understand separately the legal
meanings appropriately derivable from factual circumstances in the context
of all the other non-legal meanings. Rarely, however, is the meaning so
clear that all non-legal consequences fall away, and the only recourse is the
equivalent of war. What Dean Brest and I were saying, if I may be so
bold, was that it is not simply the lawyer’s job to throw the law over the
transom to the client and let the client deal with it. Rather, the effective
counseling lawyer wades into the Venn diagram overlap between law and
non-law where clear boundaries fall away.36
Effective counseling lawyers usually pick this up on their own, but that
33
Id. at 20. For a detailed description of a clinical education approach to this kind of
interdisciplinary interaction, see Dina Schlossberg, An Examination of Transaction Law Clinics and
Interdisciplinary Education, 11 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 195, 202 (2003).
34
Roy Stuckey discusses a similar theme. STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 143 (“[A] person
with an engaged, active stance and the perspective of a problem-solver inside the problem situation
acquires an understanding quite different from that of a person with a passive stance and the
perspective of an observer.” (quoting Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise,
Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 359 (1995))).
35
For an extended treatment of this theme, see Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Models and Games: The
Difference Between Explanation and Understanding for Lawyers and Ethicists, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
613, 615 (2008).
36
That is not to deny some clients want it that way or that many lawyers practice that way. I just
believe it is sub-optimal. Watson and Binder are each saying that lawyers need to be aware of the
overlap. See supra notes 17, 29 and accompanying text. My contribution to the discussion is a further
exposition of the state of mind it takes for a lawyer truly to be effective.
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37

does not excuse the lack of meta-thinking about the process among legal
educators, or the legal curriculum’s shortcomings on these almost
theoretical skills.38 Stuckey’s volume on best practices in legal education,
sponsored by legal clinicians, makes it clear that if we are trying to educate
a lawyer to be conscious of the context of a legal problem (another way of
saying “what’s going on?”), then mere experience in solving problems is
not enough. Indeed, even mere practice is not enough; students getting
better at understanding “what’s going on” involves “practice accompanied
by informative feedback and reflection on their own performance.”39 If the
psychoanalyst is the metaphor of a lawyer as counselor (as in the Joe and
Jane story), then it is fair to ask what some psychoanalysts do to be
effective in their practices.
C. Meaning in the Professional Relationship
Not surprisingly, there seems to be deeper professional introspection
about the relationship between the counselor’s subjective views and
experiences, on one hand, and those of the client, on the other, in
psychoanalysis versus law. Andrew Watson’s observation about lawyers
and clients strikes me as beyond dispute: if we assume that the
psychological phenomena of transference, counter-transference, and
resistance exist between human beings, they will exist in the lawyer-client
counseling relationship.40 Commentators are not of one mind about the
extent of reflection that lawyers ought to undertake regarding the
psychological aspects inherent in their counseling relationships. Watson, a
psychiatrist, said, “[W]hile lawyers may not often arrive at the depth of
understanding about clients which the psychologist or psychiatrist might, at
the very least they can have a human awareness about the complex and
relatively invisible motives that drive their clients into conflict.”41 Binder,
explicitly taking note of Watson, is more reserved. While lawyers ought to
37

There I go again. See supra note 20.
See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 143 (“Simply providing opportunities to engage in
problem-solving activities is not enough. The development of problem-solving expertise is enhanced
by studying theories related to problem-solving and by receiving assistance from teachers.”).
39
Id.
40
WATSON, supra note 11, at 23. “In the legal . . . setting, [transference] includes all of the
reactions stimulated by the reality of the lawyer’s involvement as well as some unreal and distorted
impressions derived from prior experiences and their resultant patternings of the client’s psychic life.”
Id. at 24. “[C]ounter-transference . . . is the same kind of dynamic transactional information taken
from the perspective of the client to the lawyer. These responses are stimulated by the client in the
lawyer, have the same components as those of the transference, and are to be understood in the same
way.” Id. at 25. Resistances are barriers to the expression of ideas “related to unconscious attitudes
whose purpose is to not express the idea which is being obscured.” Id. at 8 n.3. Suffice to say that I
could supply myriad anecdotal evidence of these phenomena in my own relationships with law firm
clients and CEOs to whom I have reported as the general counsel.
41
Id. at 11.
38
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“[t]ak[e] advantage of elementary psychological principles,” particularly in
active listening and empathetic understanding, lawyers are not
psychologists.42 Binder observes: “Your professional task is to help clients
achieve their legal goals, not to provide psychological counseling. Unless
you have specialized training as a psychologist or a social worker, you
cannot expect to identify and remove deep psychological needs blocking
clients’ full participation.”43 I agree with Binder that lawyers cannot treat
their clients’ psychological problems. I do not, however, see that as a
reason why lawyers should not try to understand how their own
psychology aids or impairs the counseling process, just as some
psychoanalysts seem to do. Or why law schools should not provide
nascent lawyers some means for doing so.
When I say “understand their own psychology,” what I mean is dealing
with the possibility that lawyers’ resistances and counter-transferences get
in the way of understanding clients’ meanings or “what’s going on,” and
vice versa.44 What the analyst would call the patient’s hopes for psychic
health through the clinical experience, a lawyer would call the clients’ aims
and desires to be satisfied through the legal process. Nevertheless, like
their psychoanalytic counterparts, lawyers and clients are capable of
uncomfortable mutual exploration of “what’s going on” in connection with
a particular problem. The client can offer resistance to the lawyer. The
CEO wants to get a deal done, and the lawyer insists there must be a
special committee of the board with its own law firm. To the CEO, this is
nothing more than bureaucracy or, worse, insubordination. Alternatively,
the lawyer can offer resistance to the client. The sales manager shows inhouse counsel a term sheet, and asks her to write a contract “but skip the
legalese.” The lawyer in turn wonders how anybody could run a business
with the level of sloppiness and imprecision in his “handshake” deal
making.
I think that we lawyers as counselors are better off engaging in explicit
reflection about our resistances and counter-transferences, just as some
psychotherapists think about their own. Hence, I want to work the
metaphor just a bit more and draw on two observations about
psychoanalytic practice: one regarding the form of the counseling
42

BINDER ET AL., supra note 16, at 19.
Id. Others have expressed views on the lawyer-client relationship. See Robert J. Condlin,
“What’s Love Got to Do with It?”—“It’s Not Like They’re Your Friends for Christ’s Sake”: The
Complicated Relationship Between Lawyer and Client, 82 NEB. L. REV. 211, 306–11 (2003)
(explaining that lawyer-client relationships are socially complex and involve lawyers serving as both
fiduciaries and agents); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third Party
Neutral: Creativity and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 785, 793–96 (1999)
(defining what it means to be a lawyer and stressing the lawyer’s role as problem solver).
44
See supra note 40 and accompanying text (agreeing with Watson’s observations regarding
transference, counter-transference, and resistance within the lawyer-client relationship).
43
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relationship, and the other regarding the substance of what the lawyer
considers when engaged in that relationship.
1. Neutrality and Influence
Take, for example, the idea of professional neutrality or distance,
which Binder advocates as the standard approach to a lawyer as
counselor.45 My experience is that rigid neutrality in counseling (versus
advocacy) is impossible.46 In psychoanalytic practice, the analog to the
neutral lawyer-counselor is the “monolith of the analyst as blank screen.”47
Just as my conception of lawyers wading into the Venn overlap contends
with other conceptions of the appropriate level of engagement between
lawyer and client, so too there is debate among psychoanalysts about the
extent to which the analyst interjects his or her own subjective experience
into the analytic situation. While classical technique shuns the practice,
so-called “relational” technique does not reject it out of hand.48 Rather, the
question for sophisticated relational analysts is how and when do we spice
the analytic relationship with what is called “self-disclosure” or “analyst
disclosure?”49 As an outsider to such practice, what I find persuasive about
the relational approach is the acknowledgment that maintaining complete
distance and objectivity in the professional encounter is difficult, if not
impossible. Psychologist Steven Cooper observes that, for analysts, “we
are disclosing whether we are aware of it or not—or whether we like it or
not.”50
The Binder text, probably the gold standard of pedagogical work on
lawyer as counselor, makes it clear that offering one’s personal view in
connection with a final decision is firmly within the client-centered
philosophy when the client requests it,51 and sometimes even when the
client does not.52 The text is replete with examples of how to go about
offering those opinions.53 What it does not do is help the lawyer sort
through his own conscious or unconscious subjectivity in the counseling
process. For example, I do not like litigation, despite or perhaps because I

45

BINDER ET AL., supra note 16, at 346–47.
See id. at 416–20 (discussing in detail a lawyer’s involvement in final decision making and
acknowledging that lawyers may need to give advice in certain situations).
47
Steven H. Cooper, Analyst Subjectivity, Analyst Disclosure, and the Aims of Psychoanalysis, 67
PSYCHOANALYTIC QTRLY. 379, 385 (1998).
48
See id. at 380–82 (“Relational theorists observed the centrality of the analyst’s subjectivity and
sought a way to get this subjectivity into the theoretical equation.”).
49
Id. at 382.
50
Id. at 381.
51
BINDER ET AL., supra note 16, at 417–20.
52
Id. at 427–28.
53
See, e.g., id. at 428 (presenting a hypothetical situation in which an attorney offers a client
unsolicited advice).
46
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spent the first ten years of my career as a litigator. I can recall at least
two instances in which I was skeptical about the merits of proposed
litigation on what I thought were the merits of each case. Nevertheless, I
deferred to the judgment of lawyers on my staff that these were good
claims. Both matters went to trial and resulted in significant monetary
recoveries. I have wondered since then about my luck or good judgment in
deferring, because on my own I likely would not have allowed the cases to
go forward.
Certainly, my attitude would have affected how I
communicated with the client.
Compare this to Cooper’s assessment of the psychoanalyst’s desire to
influence: there is usually more focus on the content of the theory of
influence (analogous in my example to the substance of my advice as
lawyer-counselor on whether or not to sue) than on the analyst’s own
“affective experience that pushes and motivates” the influence.55 Clients
will ask me what they should do. I will have a subjective view that
influences my view of the merits. Rather than merely mouthing a standard
of neutrality, we are better off thinking about our own subjectivity in the
counseling interaction, and dealing with it explicitly, whether to control it
or to use it as a means of making progress.56
2. Theories and Influence
And what are we thinking? As lawyer-counselor, apart from the
affective source (if any) of my theories, I certainly bring my pre-existing
theories of the “Deal” or the “Problem” to the client’s hopes and aims for
the transaction or dispute, just as the psychoanalyst brings her pre-existing
theories of human psychic development to the therapeutic interaction.57 In
each case, our success depends on our ability to employ our own
professional theories against the reality that confronts us with the clients,
the adversaries, and the interested third parties.
Formulae, algorithms, and heuristics of lawyer-counselor technique are
all well and good.58 I want to delve a little deeper, however. The
54
See supra note 31 and accompanying text (expressing the lack of awareness that law students
and lawyers have of interdisciplinary counseling skills).
55
COOPER, supra note 9, at 266.
56
Cooper, supra note 47, at 381 (“What does distinguish our subjectivity in disclosure is our
conscious or deliberate attempt to reveal to the patient a construction of the self—either an aspect of
our subjectivity or a ‘fact’ about ourselves—so that something new can be explored or understood.
This means that at times, disclosure can appear to have fewer secondary process properties than
interpretation.”).
57
See COOPER, supra note 9, at 280 (discussing how a psychoanalyst’s “choice of where to begin
to formulate and what to interpret, as well as the goals of analysis, is the most obvious expression of the
analyst’s subjectivity”).
58
There is a plethora of writing on the topic. See, e.g., Michael T. Colatrella Jr., A “Lawyer for
All Seasons”: The Lawyer as Conflict-Manager, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 93, 94–97 (2012) (discussing
the role of lawyers as counselors and how they may be capable of more efficiently preventing and
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metaphor of psychoanalytic practice strikes me as helpful in dealing with
the relationship of technical disciplinary competence and the application of
that learning in the counseling environment. The psychoanalyst learns
theories of the mind itself and applies them not merely to solve a transient
problem, but to assist the patient in living a better life.59 Reflecting on the
possibilities offered by therapy, Steven Cooper observed, “psychoanalysis
has taught us that we are indoctrinating our patients while we are trying to
help. Indoctrination goes both ways in the analytic encounter. The analyst
attempts to learn the patient’s idiom, often through elucidating the patient’s
hopes.”60 Cooper’s crucial insight is the relationship, for better or worse,
among the following: (1) theory in the sense of putatively scientific
descriptions and explanations to which the academic or research side of the
professional discipline aspires; (2) theory in the more general sense of the
way ordinary people make sense of “what’s going on” (i.e., theory as a
source of meaning); and (3) theory of the means by which the professional
assists the client in practice. If a patient’s idealizations—her mental
constructs—can be a means of avoiding reality, so too the therapist’s
theory of the mind can be a limiting idealization.61 Cooper calls this the
“return of the repressed positivistic.”62 I read it to mean that, as
handling conflict); John M.A. DiPippa, How Prospect Theory Can Improve Legal Counseling, 24 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 81, 81–83 (2001) (discussing the implications of research casting down on
the current predominate model in law, the rational choice model); Gay Gellhorn et al., Law and
Language: An Interdisciplinary Study of Client Interviews, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 245, 246–51 (1994)
(discussing the need for linguistic and ethnographic research to inform relationships between clients
and their attorneys); Alexander Scherr, Lawyers and Decisions: A Model of Practical Judgment, 47
VILL. L. REV. 161, 162–64 (2002) (discussing the non-legal influences of lawyers’ practical judgment).
59
See COOPER, supra note 9, at xi (noting that psychoanalysts indoctrinate while they try to help).
60
Id.
61
See id. at xiv–xv (noting that there is pressure to explain observations according to theory
beyond an analyst’s capabilities).
62
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The variations on law and economics are a barely
repressed positivistic in academic law. The inimitable Pierre Schlag has recently commented on the
tensions that arise between the ideal objectivity of four applications of economic theory to law (those of
Frank Knight, Ronald Coase, Richard Posner, and Cass Sunstein) and the inability of any such theory
to predict legal or political outcomes. Pierre Schlag, Four Conceptualizations of the Relations of Law
to Economics (Tribulations of a Positivistic Social Science), 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 2357, 2357–58
(2012). Professor Schlag believes a positivistic social science of law is subject to the demand that it
“encounter, address, and resolve” the tension so as to be entitled to the “epistemic mantle of
knowledge:”
Because this demand is nothing more than a modest request that a positivist social
science specify its domain (its boundaries, depth, objects of inquiry, etc.) and that it
offer some reason to believe that its claimed intellectual dominion over this domain
does not turn upon extraneous considerations that escape its control. That’s one of
the requirements of the project. Pretty hard to achieve. Probably not going to
happen soon.
Id. at 2371. In a variation on the old joke, if we are searching for truth on only one side of the street
because that’s where the social science streetlight happens to be, we need to say so.
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professionals, we want to be able to fit what we are observing in the
professional encounter within the idealizations—the theories, constructs,
and models—we have learned during our professional training. As Cooper
says, it “relates to how analysts often feel the pressure or mandate to
explain, sometimes beyond our capacity to do so.”63 In other words, to
what extent does the psychoanalyst’s aspiration for knowledge within the
academic discipline impede the process of helping the client?64 The point
is that every theory is reductive in the sense of being less than all of life (or
one’s life). Practice, as opposed to academic speculation, necessarily
involves some aspect of theoretical promiscuity, even at the cost of disdain
from disciplinary theorists.65
What is true in the application of disciplinary theory to practice for
psychoanalysis is true a fortiori to the relationship between lawyer as
counselor, on one hand, and client on the other. Non-lawyers generally do
not express their aims and desires in terms of legal theory any more than
analysts express their hopes and fears in psychoanalytic theory. Yet
despite the current tension between the practicing and academic sides of
the profession, there is striking commonality in the powerful models
academics teach as the essence of legal reasoning, and what law students
take from that teaching to practice as their disciplinary idealization. As the
Carnegie Report observed, “[A]t a deep, largely uncritical level, the
students come to understand the law as a formal and rational system,
however much its doctrines and rules may diverge from the commonsense
understandings of the layperson.”66 What Cooper says about
psychoanalysis lies at the heart of lawyer-centeredness that the Carnegie
Report criticized and which Binder wants to eliminate: theory tends to
trump therapy. As a result of our professional training and experience,
“[w]e begin with a particular view of therapeutic action and define our
focus or points of observation in order to detect the process we are hoping
to achieve or, at least, observe.”67 Within the profession, we dispute
63
64

COOPER, supra note 9, at xv.
Cooper describes it this way:
I believe that one of the most problematic aspects of clinical analysis is the way that
we conflate analytic technique with our profound interest in the unconscious.
Confusion of these two sectors can lead to a stiffness in technique and a
minimization of the spontaneity in interaction that can illuminate unconscious
process.

Id. at xv.
65
See id. at 262 (noting that theory is informed by observation). Cooper thus describes himself as
“a kind of theory junkie, finding value and interest in most psychoanalytic theories yet never feeling
entirely satisfied with any single theory.” Id. at x.
66
WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF
LAW 186 (2007).
67
COOPER, supra note 9, at 262.
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theory, but in practice, “[w]here is the place for unpleasant observations—
things that we observe that do not fit our theories?”68 We need to take care
that our reflection on the client’s problem is not simply another return of
the repressed positivistic—the fixation on objectivity and reduction—that
seems to underlie our professional self-selection as lawyers.
Even within the discipline, lawyers (and even law professors) face
contrasting idioms of formal law and less formal “legal lore,” occasions
where the things we observe fail to fit our theories of explanation.69 Rick
Hills of the NYU Law School points out an instance of non-congruence of
“street” idiom even among lawyers themselves and the formal language
expected in the disciplinary ideal.70 The first he calls “legal conventional
wisdom,” consisting “of those catchphrases, habits of mind, slogans,
proverbs, maxims, half-truths, and rough predictions for what courts do,
usually without much explanation or justification.”71 The second is more
traditional legal reasoning, which Professor Hills characterizes as
“normative and justificatory: [s]ome propositions are deduced from, or
invalidated by, other more basic propositions, all of which hold together as
a consistent system of rules serving some general goal or set of goals (say,
obedience to the text enacted by an authoritative sovereign, internal logical
consistency, etc).”72 His thesis is that legal conventional wisdom can
trump the result of more rigorous legal reasoning—the example being the
prevailing view that New York City may not exact bridge or road tolls
without authorization from the state.73 Professor Hills’s moral from the
story is that good lawyers should see when there is a gap between law and
lore, and reflect on whether it is normatively good or bad. That Professor
Hills sees this as an issue within the discipline itself is a reflection of the
power of the disciplinary idealization.
It seems to me the answer, ironically, is to do more to educate our
students in thinking about thinking inside and outside the disciplinary
idiom. Cooper uses the term “[c]ourting [s]urprise” for the psychoanalytic
clinician’s experience in applying theory to the real life patients bring to
the office.74 What he means is that life has a way of failing to adhere to
our aspirations of scientific theorizing; nevertheless, “[w]e are deeply
68

Id. at 262–63.
Rick Hills, Legal Conventional Wisdom Versus Legal Reasoning: The Case for New York
City’s Power to Impose Congestion Fees, PRAWFSBLAWG (July 12, 2012, 6:25
AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/07/statutory-construction-the-power-of-citiesthe-case-of-new-york-city-and-congestion-fees.html (discussing the distinction between legal
conventional wisdom and legal reasoning).
70
Id.
71
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
See COOPER, supra note 9, at 264–65 (describing an experience with a patient).
69
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attached to our theories, for they follow us around, for better and worse,
like our character, our adaptation. They seduce us and force us to see
things through a particular lens.”75 For the analyst, one of the problems of
theory is that it is not merely an objective tool used to interpret and classify
the patient’s symptoms, but it is the analyst’s very means of
conceptualizing the patient’s information and structuring how the analyst
might go about influencing the patient.76 Therein lies the conundrum. If
the analyst’s theory is powerful, but life has a way of not following theory,
what should the analyst do? Cooper’s answer is that the analyst is obliged
to reflect on his “own resistance to learning from new experience in
revising theory.”77 This is because objectivity in the clinical encounter is
an unobtainable ideal.78 In analysis, as elsewhere, we cannot suspend our
theories, our ways of making sense;79 rather, theory is “the guide who leads
and determines the analyst’s formulations and interpretive activity through
shifting foci on past, present, and future threads within the patient’s
associations and the interaction between patient and analyst.”80
My sense is that we do a pretty good, though not perfect,81 job of
inculcating law students in precisely this kind of disciplinary theory, by
which I mean the tools lawyers use in the professional encounter to explain
“what’s going on” from the standpoint of a lawyer. But Cooper could just
as well have been commenting on lawyers and clients rather than clinicians
and analysts when he observed:
There is often a tension holding theory as friend and foe, self
and alien, welcome and unwelcome fellow traveler, and
ultimately, constructive and destructive factor in the
understanding of clinical process. Theory always expresses
our attachment to ideas and important others in our lives.
Our body of theory is our metaphorical body—our hearts,
75

Id. at 265.
See id. at 266 (describing the interaction between the analyst’s theories and his or her attempts
to influence and understand the patient).
77
Id. at 267.
78
In the Freudian ideal, the analyst merely listened in the manner of a scientific investigator.
Freud, in a letter to Sandor Ferenczi, said, “I consider that one should not make theories. They should
arrive unexpectedly in your house, like a stranger one hasn’t invited.” Id. at 268.
79
Id. at 269.
80
Id. at 271.
81
Why not perfect? We teach to think like lawyers, but there are different teachers, different
lawyers, and different ways to think like lawyers. My casual empiricism is that there is pretty much
one way to think like a first-year law student taking a typical issue-spotting exam. I base that on the
fact that most of my high-performing students seem to perform well on the exams of my colleagues,
and most of the students in academic trouble are in trouble across the board. But I know from faculty
exchanges, faculty meetings, hallway conversation, chat board materials, and other conversations about
theory, doctrine, and practice that my approach to dealing with problems is not necessarily the same,
for better or worse, than my colleagues. I will address a way to deal with this in the last section.
76
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minds, limbs, and desires. It expresses our hopes, and herein
lies the passion with which we defend our theory, the fervor
with which we express it, and often the rigidity and anxiety
with which we listen to new ideas and observations.82
As Professor Hills suggests, there is theory—a disciplinary ideal—at the
heart of our formal system.83 Practitioners and theorists of that formal
system of law resist conventional wisdom of lore even when it turns out
that lore, more than law, reflects commonsense understandings.84
For professionals steeped in a disciplinary ideal from the first day of
law school, that is uncomfortable. Cooper says that “the only times I am
very motivated to rethink theory are when I am unhappy with what I know
about the theory I have.”85 As lawyers, we spend our student years
learning particular theories that offer us an integrated and coherent model
of the world. As Cooper suggests, those theories, like Freudian or British
object relations or American relational theory in psychoanalysis, “are like
an object attachment or a self-representation that we cling to. They
provide safety; they are home. Otherwise, why would so many people,
without really knowing what they feel or think, offer, out of hand, blanket
rejections of innovations in theory and technique?”86 Yet being steeped in
theory is a significant problem for a lawyer, who by desire or client
demand, ventures into the Venn overlap. As Cooper observes in the
psychoanalytic encounter, the analyst’s struggle is with the conscious or
unconscious desire to influence the patient’s outcomes against a
professional standard that advocates neutrality and objectivity.87 If you
believe, as Cooper does for analysts and as I do for lawyers, that we want
to influence, then we are better off countering the repressed positivistic
with explicit thinking about our theories and disciplinary ideals in the
context of our real life counseling.88
82

COOPER, supra note 9, at 271.
See Hills, supra note 69 (suggesting that legal conventional wisdom is more controlling than
legal reasoning when it comes to implementing city-imposed tolls on New York City bridges and
tunnels).
84
Within faculties, an example of this is the difference between the law and lore of tenure.
Generally the law of tenure is the AAUP 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Tenure, as updated and as incorporated by reference into contracts or faculty handbooks. See AM.
ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE
4–5 (rev. ed. 1970), available at http://www.aaup.org/file/1940-Statement-of-Principles-on-AcademicFreedom-and-Tenure.pdf (setting out terms, probationary periods and rules for termination of tenure). I
am willing to assert that the conception of the rights conferred by tenure, at least in the minds of many
faculty members, go beyond those explicitly set forth.
85
COOPER, supra note 9, at 271.
86
Id. at 272.
87
Id. at 272–73.
88
See id. at 273 (theorizing that it is easier to balance goals of influence and neutrality if the
analyst is aware of her own natural instinct to influence).
83
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This is not easy stuff. But nobody promised us professional rose
gardens. The challenge for any lawyer who seeks to be anything more than
a blank screen or tennis ball backboard is to judge when to confine herself
to abstract disciplinary models and when to seek a different metaphor. We
influence our clients and they influence us.
Different lawyering
circumstances call for different approaches to influence. Sometimes the
lawyer ought to be relatively dispassionate. That is the lesson of the Joe
and Jane story. It was not my money, and I could not make the decision
for Joe and Jane. I was uncomfortable telling either what to do. Nor was I
prepared to say that I thought the seller was a lying scumbag for two
reasons: (1) I did not know if that was right; and (2) I decided that advice
would not be helpful in their decision-making process. All I could do was
my best to help them overcome the gap between the non-legal risks,
uncertainties, fears, and consequences on one hand, and what I knew as a
lawyer on the other.
I do not believe, however, that the lawyer as counselor must always be
dispassionate, any more than the psychotherapist must always be a
backboard to the patient’s tennis ball. If the lawyer is external, then
assimilation of the decision-making process—the ultimate integration of
legal and non-legal meaning—may be subtle. When I was a law firm
lawyer, most of my clients still seemed to want me to say something to this
effect: “It is your decision and your money, not mine, but if it were mine,
this is what I would do.”89 If the lawyer is in-house, it seems to me that it
is entirely appropriate for the lawyer to put on her business hat and say to
the Human Resources (“HR”) officer, “Knowing what I know about this
situation, and knowing the law as I do, here is the action we should take.”
Imagine that a company’s human resources officer has decided a particular
employee is poisoning the office environment, and curative steps must be
taken. Nevertheless, the employee is within a protected classification
under equal opportunity legislation. Either the HR officer has to
internalize the judgments an employment lawyer is capable of making, or
the lawyer has to internalize what the HR officer knows about her own
discipline.
Consider the following situation. A new general counsel joins a public
company. Some time before, the company had completed the acquisition
of a business. The company’s management team is disappointed in the
results of the acquisition and has a nice story to tell about why there were
contractual and extra-contractual misrepresentations by the seller. I am
skeptical that the lawyer can be wholly dispassionate in her assessment of
the chances of prevailing in a lawsuit. If anything, she is likely to be
89
It is possible that this was self-selecting in that clients knew I was likely to say this anyway and
if they did not want to hear it, they migrated elsewhere.
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subject to what Cooper calls the “fantasy” of the return of the repressed
positivistic: that “the analyst is able to put aside his feelings and thoughts
so as not to have them influence his view of the patient’s psychic reality.”90
In her case, the fantasy is that she can give dispassionate objective
advice about precisely what the law is and how her new business ought to
use it. Although she does not like litigation, she thinks the narrative
presents a colorable if not compelling legal claim. But there are certainly
implications of filing the lawsuit beyond those suggested by the purely
legal considerations. Filing a lawsuit is like firing a bullet that has a good
chance of ricocheting unpredictably. Indeed, a subsequent lawsuit over an
acquisition, regardless of its legal merits, may be perceived as public
admission that something failed in the acquisition process, which reflects
poorly on management. The new general counsel wants very much to
help. She does not want to say “no” in connection with the first issue that
her new team presents her. She can come up with five good reasons to file
and five not to file. How should she distinguish, if at all, her theory of the
legal case and her personal predilections? Should she express a business
view for or against filing? Her formal law school education likely did little
more in connection with these nuanced judgments than exactly what the
Carnegie Report said: to inculcate particular legal theories by which, as a
lawyer, she would make sense of the world.91
The question is whether those theories get in the way of her
understanding, from the client’s standpoint, what is really going on. As
Cooper observes, classical (I assume Freudian) and other psychoanalytic
theories may become less vibrant and less meaningful over time and need
to change.92 That does not mean the theories lose all utility; rather “[i]t
means only that, for particular practitioners, patients, observers, or
listeners, we can benefit from extending our observational field to include
new metaphors.”93 I interpret this insight about openness to learning in a
micro as well as macro sense. Among other observations, Cooper says
about our theories that “it is extremely easy for all of us to pour old wine
into new bottles, just as some who are frightened of change, yet sense it,
try to pour new wine into old bottles.”94 Trying merely to suppress one’s
affect while dealing with a client problem strikes me as a bad idea. But
even the forward-thinking Binder’s “client-centered” approach in the
Binder text incorporates an ideal stance of professional neutrality. Our
hypothetical general counsel needs to reflect about her own desire to
90

COOPER, supra note 9, at 278.
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 66, at 63.
92
COOPER, supra note 9, at 290 (stating that psychoanalyst must change and learn over time in
order to continue to be effective and achieve their goal).
93
Id. at 264.
94
Id.
91

2013]

WHAT’S GOING ON?

1381

influence and to “court surprise”; in short, to at once be a master of her
professional discipline while incorporating, in the client’s idiom, other
theories of “what’s going on.”
That is never easy, but the subject of the next section is how law
school education might help.
III. PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS FOR INCORPORATING THE
PSYCHOANALYSIS METAPHOR INTO LEGAL EDUCATION
In the current environment in which responsible law professors write
about how law schools are failing95 and anonymous Internet pundits
predict law school closures,96 even I wonder whether the inwardness of my
focus here constitutes rearranging metaphoric deck chairs. Several
colleagues I have asked to comment on this Essay have raised the issue of
structural impediments to recasting legal education if we were fully to
follow the implications of using analogs from health-care education and
licensure. Michael Madison, for example, has recently described changes
to his doctrinal classroom that go well beyond classical Langdellian case
analysis and reflect the kind of client-centeredness that Binder has long
been advocating.97 Like Professor Madison, I want us to do a better job of
connecting the technical aspects of traditional law school education, even
in the traditional classroom, to what lawyers (particularly transactional or
counseling lawyers) need to do in action.98 I agree with Professor Madison
that “the problems with the legal profession and legal education are too
large and too deep to be fixed in any particular classroom.”99 Like

95

E.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012).
See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Profs Predict Law School Closings as More Grads Earn Less
than Break-Even Pay, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 19, 2010),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/profs_predict_law_school_closings_as_more_grads_earn_less
_than_break-even_p (predicting school closures due to low graduate salaries, increased student loans,
and decreased law school applications); Brian Leiter, Predictions About Closings of ABA-Accredited
Law Schools over the Next Decade, LEITER’S L. SCHS. REP. (Oct. 3, 2012),
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2012/10/predictions-about-closings-of-aba-accredited-lawschools-over-the-next-decade.html (estimating ten law schools will close in the next decade).
97
See Mike Madison, (Not So) Newish Law School Teaching, MADISONIAN.NET (July 25, 2012),
http://madisonian.net/2012/07/25/not-so-newish-law-school-teaching/ (explaining the teaching method
consisting of an unconventional approach of client-centeredness applied to conventional subjects).
98
Professor Madison’s blog post links to an essay that criticizes the Carnegie Report for failing to
come to terms with action or doing like a lawyer as opposed to merely thinking like a lawyer. Id.; see
also Kristen Holmquist, Challenging Carnegie, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 353, 356 (2012) (challenging the
Carnegie Report’s conclusion that law schools teach students to think like lawyers). Thinking versus
action in business lawyering is the subject of my recent article as well. See Lipshaw, Venn Diagram,
supra note 1, at 3 (focusing on “the practical reality of lawyers making particularly difficult kinds of
judgments, namely those that require blending legal judgment with knowledge from disciplines outside
the law”).
99
Madison, supra note 97.
96
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Professor Madison, I will not try to eat the entire elephant in one sitting.100
Nevertheless, I suspect teaching lawyer-counselors how to assess
what’s really going on—integrating practical wisdom or phronesis—would
require fundamental changes in legal education, largely throwing off the
legacy of Langdellian case method for some piece of the first year and
modifying the traditional three-year classroom curriculum.101 While I
intended the comparisons to be metaphoric, I could not help but think
about the considerable additional commitment required for full licensure as
a psychoanalyst.102 I am not suggesting that we institute licensing and
educational requirements under which lawyers, like psychoanalysts, would

100
Nor will I rehash the good work that has been done on educating lawyers as counselors or
problem-solvers. See, e.g., Andrea L. Johnson, Teaching Creative Problem Solving and Applied
Reasoning Skills: A Modular Approach, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 389, 389 (1998) (providing guidance on
integrating problem solving skills into curriculums); Linda Morton, Teaching Creative Problem
Solving: A Paradigmatic Approach, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 375, 375 (1998) (describing the authors use of
a visual paradigm in the law school curriculum to teach creative problem solving); Andrea M.
Seielstad, Community Building as a Means of Teaching Creative, Cooperative, and Complex Problem
Solving in Clinical Legal Education, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 445, 447 (2002) (describing “a model for
teaching legal problem-solving skills in the context of a clinical program” that combines various
lawyering skills”); Marjorie A. Silver, Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Interference in the
Lawyer/Client Relationship, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 259, 260 (1999) (focusing on lawyers’ relationships
with their clients); Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good
Psychologists: Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 437,
440 (2008) (filling in the gaps in applying psychology to law by focusing on the psychological insights
necessary for “providing initial counseling to clients in civil cases”); Clifford S. Zimmerman,
“Thinking Beyond My Own Interpretation”: Reflections on Collaborative and Cooperative Learning
Theory in the Law School Curriculum, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 957, 970 (1999) (examining the “conflict
between individual and institutional concerns in legal education”).
101
For an explicit reference to the development of phronesis as a best practice in legal education,
see STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 149.
102
In most states, psychoanalysts are legally and functionally capable of counseling at roughly the
same age (early to mid-thirties) that young lawyers are practicing law. In New York, for example, to
be licensed as a psychoanalyst, you must be at least twenty-one years old, have passed the examination,
and have satisfied the education and experience requirements. The education requirement is that one
must obtain at least a master’s degree in an appropriate field and complete a registered and accredited
program in psychoanalytic study.
Psychoanalysis License Requirements, NYSED.GOV,
http://www.op.nysed.gov/prof/mhp/psyanllic.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2013).
In turn, such a program must comply with the American Psychoanalytic Association’s
requirements. BD. ON PROF’L STANDARDS OF THE AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR
EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 1 (2010) [hereinafter BOPS], available at
http://www.apsa.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=yo5vqUk7jl8=. Even to be eligible for psychoanalytic
training, one must either be: (1) a physician nearing completion of a residency in psychiatry; (2) a
mental health professional with a doctoral degree from an accredited mental health program and 3,000
hours of clinical experience; or (3) a licensed mental health professional who has graduated from a
masters program where such degree is the highest obtainable in the field (such as social work or
psychiatric nursing) and completed another two years post-masters of didactic and clinical training. Id.
at 2. The standard also requires that the applicant demonstrate the appropriate level of maturity and
personal and ethical integrity. Id. at 3. Once admitted, the student must undergo analysis, attend
seminars, and conduct analysis under supervision. Id. at 3–5.
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not act as unsupervised counselors until they were in their mid-thirties.103
Even under my metaphor, I suspect counseling people like Joe and Jane, or
the hypothetical CEO, does not require this intensity of professional
preparation. But that counseling is also not like my barber giving me
advice whether my buzz cut ought to be performed with a number one or
number two clipper, and whether the clipper should be metal or plastic.
The point is that we have no standards of professional education,
development, or licensure in phronesis, despite the fact that lawyers in
their twenties and early thirties will typically be licensed to give advice
more akin to psychotherapy than grooming tips, and in circumstances
where they are likely to be called on for that advice.104
I want to make some preliminary and far more modest suggestions, in
keeping with the themes of the psychoanalysis metaphor, about how
reflection on the “repressed positivistic” and “courting surprise” might
benefit our students in the “what’s going on” aspect of client-centeredness.
A. Dealing with the Repressed Positivistic
In my experience, very few of our entering law students have ever
been the client of a lawyer. I propose taking Binder’s concept of clientcenteredness and Stuckey’s concept of context-based instruction a step
further. Even if medical and dental schools do not, as Harvard does, have
courses called something like “Patient-Doctor One,”105 and “Patient-Doctor

103
New York’s minimum age requirement seems laughable in view of the other requirements. By
my calculation, if a physician goes straight through school and residency, he will be applying for
psychoanalytic training at about age thirty, and finishing in his mid-thirties.
104
Comparing time commitments more generally to medical education, as much as I deeply
admire my evening students who leave their full-time jobs, miss dinner with their families, and sit in
first-year classes several nights a week until close to 10:00 p.m., I also know that there are no evening
or part-time medical schools. Should we extend schooling or replace some of the current curriculum
with internships or residencies in “teaching firms,” equivalent to “teaching hospitals,” so that lawyers
may develop counseling phronesis? What about bridge programs? Solo Practice University is an
example of a for-profit enterprise that has associated itself with a number of law schools (for example,
New York Law School, Chapman University School of Law, and the Bowen School of Law at
Arkansas-Little Rock), and seeks to fill in the gap between traditional legal education and practice. See
Meet Solo Practice University, SOLO PRAC. UNIV., http://solopracticeuniversity.com/about/ (last visited
Jan. 26, 2013) (discussing the idea behind Solo Practice University and its objective to serve as “a
single online destination where lawyers and law students learn the basics of running a solo practice,
take classes and get expert feedback from lawyers and business professionals in specialized fields”).
These are all structural issues beyond the scope of this Essay.
105
Patient–Doctor I, HARV. MED. SCH., http://www.medcatalog.harvard.edu/ coursedetails.aspx?
cl=preclinical1&id=17561 (last visited Jan. 26, 2013).

Students will learn to take a medical history with excellent communication skills and
to develop relationships with patients. Understanding the patient’s experience of
illness and various aspects of the patient-doctor relationship will be important
themes of the course. Students and faculty will meet in small groups for 2
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106

Two,” every aspiring doctor or dentist has at one time been a patient.107
Nevertheless, under our current system, law students show up for the first
day of the first year and get bombarded thereafter with case analysis, a
soupçon of statutory construction, and an intense introduction to legal
research and brief and memo writing. Less than three years later, they are
fully licensed to hold themselves out as lawyers and counselors to real
clients, whether or not they are prepared to be the latter. Unless they have
gone out of their way to participate in clinics, the result of the traditional
approach is to repress the positivistic view of law and lawyering that is
likely to impede effective counseling. They learn to be technically
proficient lawyers without ever having a supervised educational experience
of what it is like to be on the other side of the desk. In the passionate
words of Professor Madison:
I can only note that I don’t have a difficult time keeping a
client-centered perspective well, front and center. I’ve been
a client. (Lots of lawyers and law professors say: to get a
great perspective on the legal system, be a juror. I say:
That’s fine, but to really understand the legal system—and
how dehumanizing and alienating it can be—be a client.
Want to know why lawyers are unhappy? Ask a client.
*They’re*[sic] unhappy. Find happy clients, and you will
often find happy lawyers. . . .)108
With the innovations he developed and contributed to the “Educational
hours/week for patient interviews and tutorial discussions. Satisfactory completion
of Patient Doctor I is a prerequisite for Patient Doctor II.
Id.
106
Patient-Doctor II, HARV. MED. SCH., http://www.medcatalog.harvard.edu/ coursedetails.aspx?
cl=preclinical2&id=17577 (last visited Jan. 26, 2013).

Patient-Doctor II is a prerequisite for all core clerkships. It extends instruction in
the techniques of interviewing begun in Patient-Doctor I. The emphasis in PatientDoctor II is on the development of clinical skills and professional behavior
appropriate for the beginning of clerkships, with special focus on learning the
physical examination. The patient-physician relationship receives continued
attention. Teaching in lectures, demonstrations, small groups and at the bedside are
the primary methods of instruction.
Id.
107
See HMS Night of Fun Clip 2002—Patient/Doctor 1, YOUTUBE (June 8, 2008),
http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=jS8S3BOeZFQ (last visited Feb. 2, 2013) for a hilarious send-up of
the course. I liked the tagline to the YouTube video: “PD1 is the course that tries to turn medical
students into humans.” Id.
108
Madison, supra note 97. When I advised that I wanted to quote this, Professor Madison told
me he thought it sounded like he was being flippant. I do not think it sounds flippant at all, but he adds
an addendum to the blog post by saying that “to say that happy clients and happy lawyers go together
may be appropriately flip for a blog but too brief for a real analysis.” Id.
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Tomorrow’s Lawyers” portfolio, Professor Madison is already ahead of
the curve in dealing with the return of the repressed positivistic in his
classrooms. I offer the following additional suggestions.
1. “Law Student as Client” Interaction
Once admitted, the psychoanalyst-in-training must undergo her own
psychoanalysis “with a training analyst usually conducted with the analyst
on the couch at a frequency of at least four sessions per week on separate
days.”110 Might there be an analog to the analyst’s own analysis in having
law students bring their own problems as client to student-lawyer teams?
The teams would not actually practice law outside the school, but the real
problems would be the source of a simulation/clinical exercise in which
students have skin in the game as clients. The point is to develop the
affective experience of being a client for purposes of understanding, from
the other side of the desk, what it means to hear one’s problem addressed
in the legal idiom. As the chief legal officer of a company dealing with
outside lawyers, I was as often the client as the lawyer. I know from my
own experience that once you care about an outcome, you are quite capable
of seeing what the lawyer is telling you as wholly divorced from reality or
common sense, even if it may be the right legal answer.
2. Teaching Metacognition
This is the explicitly cognitive counterpart of the affective “law student
as client” experience: the student’s thinking about her own thinking as part
of the learning process.111 More concretely, it roughly describes that
aspect of knowledge a learner invokes in developing strategies to use other
knowledge effectively; for example, how to marshal what one knows for
the purpose of an examination. At Suffolk University Law School,
Saundra Yauncey McGuire, the Assistant Vice Chancellor for Learning,
Teaching, and Retention at Louisiana State University, and a chemistry
109
About ETL, EDUCATING TOMORROW’S LAWYERS: PUTTING KNOWLEDGE INTO PRACTICE,
http://educatingtomorrowslawyers.du.edu/about-etl/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
For Professor
Madison’s Copyright course materials, see Copyright Law, EDUCATING TOMORROW’S LAWYERS:
PUTTING
KNOWLEDGE
INTO
PRACTICE,
http://educatingtomorrowslawyers.du.edu/courseportfolios/detail/copyright-law (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
110
BOPS, supra note 102.
111
See Robin A. Boyle, Employing Active-Learning Techniques and Metacognition in Law
School: Shifting Energy from Professor to Student, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 13–14, 17 (2003)
(advancing the notion that metacognition now should be comprised of law students actively engaging
with the materials instead of just passively reading them); Jennifer A. Livingston, Metacognition: An
Overview (1997), http://gse.buffalo.edu/fas/shuell/cep564/metacog.htm (describing metacognition as a
“higher order thinking which involves active control over the cognitive processes engaged in
learning”). Stuckey does not use the phrase “metacognition,” but it is implicit in the self-reflection
required for effective context-based instruction. See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 141–43
(advocating for schools to employ context-based education).
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professor recently talked to us about the use of metacognitive insights to
improve law student academic performance.112 What struck me was the
unusual (for law school) focus on teaching techniques of self-reflection. If
it is possible to teach students to think about how they think about legal
doctrine, then it seems equally likely we can teach them about how they
think about their relationship with a client.113
B. “Courting Surprise”
Two of my favorite doctrinal teaching exercises involve shocking
students into realizing that there are sometimes significant limits on their
ability to solve legal problems by using the very materials they are learning
in law school. The first is familiar to anybody who teaches the “battle of
the forms” under the Uniform Commercial Code. Notwithstanding a
couple cases of infamous judicial misunderstanding,114 it is well
understood that a seller of goods dealing with a knowledgeable buyer in
the typical exchange of purchase orders and invoices will not be able to
eliminate the buyer-oriented implied warranties under Article Two.115 I
usually conclude the discussion by asking students to act as the seller’s
lawyer to come up with a foolproof way of writing the document so as to
incorporate an effective disclaimer of the implied warranty of
merchantability. What they discover is that it is like playing tic-tac-toe.
As long as the buyer makes the right moves, the seller cannot win the
game. So, to their surprise, any modification or disclaimer requires a
112
Saundra Yancy McGuire, Teach Law Students HOW to Learn: Metacognition Is the Key!,
Presentation to Suffolk Univ. Law Sch. Faculty, May 10, 2012 (on file with Author).
113
When I teach contracts, I do my own variant on what Stewart Macaulay has championed for
fifty years: placing legal doctrine in the context of action by clients, their lawyers, and judges both
“before-the-fact” in a transactional sense, and “after-the-fact” in a litigative sense. See Jeffrey M.
Lipshaw, Metaphors, Models, and Meaning in Contract Law, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 987, 994 (2012)
(defending the notion that contract law should be taught as a metaphor to increase student
understanding by providing them with the perspective of the contract particpiants). The jury is still out
on whether it works or not, but this was part of a touching note I received from a student after grades
got distributed this past year: “‘[R]easonable minds can differ’ is your token (in my mind) and this is
something I will never forget in my law career. As we 1L’s attempted to hang in to any black and
white we could find, we did so in a grey world.” E-mail from Liam T. O’Connell to Author, (June 17,
2012) (on file with Author)
114
See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997) (ruling that an arbitration
clause is valid even if the buyer does not receive notice of the clause aside from the terms and
conditions included in the box and that an allegation that an arbitration clause is meant to defraud does
not make it unenforceable); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining
that a two-party contract is not the same as the exclusive rights present within copyright law, thus the
contract between the CD company and the shrinkwrap company is enforceable because additional
terms were presented with the goods, and the goods were not returned).
115
U.C.C. §§ 2-104(1), 2-314(1) (1995) (explaining the definition of a merchant as one that has
“knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction” and that a warranty is
often implied from the contract).
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negotiation and agreement that is outside the default rules.
The second arises in the law of agency. The idea of apparent authority
or inherent agency power is that the agent’s authority to bind the principal
to a third party arises solely from the appearance that either the principal or
the agent creates from the standpoint of the third party.116 Whether there
was actual express or implied authority between the principal and agent is
irrelevant.117 Indeed, the standard teaching cases on apparent authority
deal with the dilemma that arises when the agent expressly lacks actual
authority, but the appearance of authority nevertheless exists.118 I conclude
the discussion by asking students to act as the principal’s lawyer and to
come up with a way of restricting the agent so that the problem of apparent
authority never arises. Invariably, students suggest a number of methods,
none of which can ever keep the agent from ignoring the restriction and
creating apparent authority anyway. Again, to their surprise, the lesson is
that there are some legal problems for which the law has no answer; the
principal’s best solution is to hire trustworthy and conscientious agents.
In the big scheme of education, these are trivial examples, but we
could do more to court surprise in our students. For example, I have in
mind something my colleague, Jessica Silbey, suggests which is coteaching within law school doctrinal courses. Professor Silbey and I teach
in different substantive areas. I teach business law and contracts; she
teaches constitutional law and intellectual property. It is also clear from
dozens of delightful arguments on all sorts of subjects that we do not
always see the world in the same way. I would love to co-teach with her a
course dealing with the overlap of business and intellectual property. We
would let law students encounter law professors who may have different
organizing principles, or reflect different concerns or techniques or
outcomes for complex problems. Even more dramatically, we could be coteaching across the schools in the university, and thus courting surprise in
our students by didactic exposure to non-legal frames of reference.119
IV. CONCLUSION
This Essay focuses on just one segment of law practice and education,
namely the counseling work that many or most lawyers undertake even
from the early stages of their careers, which I contend the legal curriculum
insufficiently addresses. I have suggested shifting our metaphor from the
116
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & JEFFREY M. LIPSHAW, UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTITIES § 2.03
(4th ed. 2009).
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
For an example of the upper-level program at Stanford Law School, see Larry Kramer, JD
Program: Letter from the Dean, http://www.law.stanford.edu/degrees/jd/letter-from-the-dean (last
visited Feb. 3, 2013).
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“lawyer as warrior” to the “lawyer as psychoanalyst,” and considered some
of the implications of doing so. I do not have answers to these questions,
but I am willing to reflect and court surprise. I hope the rest of the legal
academy is willing as well.

